Free tool · GENERATE
Random PIN Generator
Get a random 4, 6 or 8 digit PIN that is not a date, a repeat, a keypad pattern or one of the most common PINs.
Runs 100% in your browser. Nothing you type or upload is sent anywhere or stored.
Checked locally against common PINs, dates, years, repeats and keypad lines.
Digits come from crypto.getRandomValues. Nothing you generate or test leaves this page.
How it works
People pick PINs badly: about one in ten leaked 4 digit PINs is 1234. A thief with your card or phone usually gets a few tries, so a PIN only works if it is not among the first ones they guess.
This tool draws each digit with crypto.getRandomValues, then throws the result away and draws again if it matches a weak pattern:
- the most common PINs from leaked data (1234, 0000, 1212, 6969 and friends)
- repeats (5555), runs up or down (3456, 8765) and keypad lines (2580, 1470)
- repeated blocks and mirrors (1313, 4664, 123123)
- years from 1900 to 2099 and anything that reads as a day and month (DDMM, MMDD, DDMMYY, MMDDYYYY)
Those rules reject about 1 in 10 of all 4 digit PINs and about 1 in 11 six digit PINs, and every PIN that survives is equally likely. Use the tester to check a PIN you already have. Then store new PINs somewhere better than a sticky note, and never on the same card or in the same wallet they protect.
Read more: How to lock notes on iPhone.
Questions
1234, 1111, 0000, 1212 and 7777 top every leaked PIN study. Close behind are repeated digits, straight runs like 4567, keypad lines like 2580, years like 1990, and dates such as 1225 or 0704. This generator rejects all of them.
Yes. A random 4 digit PIN has 10,000 options, a 6 digit PIN has 1,000,000. If your phone or app allows 6 digits, use 6. For a phone passcode, a longer alphanumeric code is better still.
No. Birthdays and anniversaries are the first thing someone who knows you will try, and they are often visible on social media or documents in the same wallet as your card.
Barely. Filtering out the guessable patterns removes about a tenth of all 4 digit PINs, and the remaining ones are still chosen uniformly at random, so each is equally likely. Attackers gain nothing because they would have tried those weak PINs first anyway.
